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3Abstract.
This writing argues that some embedded moral and religious linkages in Kant’s metaphysical
thought have been unobserved in much recent philosophical commentary, something we may
attribute to the de-emphasis of metaphysics within significant parts of the contemporary
academic world, combined with a lack of awareness of the religious milieu within which he
worked. Paradoxically in the light of this, and based on the religious content I find in the first
Critique and elsewhere, I explore what I perceive to be Kant’s attempt to steer traditional
religious doctrines and practice into a secular, individualised, scientifically congruent,
completely independent and universally acceptable format. From this, I develop the idea that
an appreciation of these efforts to reform earlier theological thought allows for a more
complete and coherent interpretation of critical philosophy than has previously been
available, with application, for example, to a heightened understanding of the employment of
the idea of things in themselves. The primary notion involved in this amended reading is the
primacy Kant gives to practical reason.
On this reading, Transcendental Idealism reverses the relationship between mind and nature,
in that the natural world of appearances in its totality is now seen to have its being
contingently within the mind as a perceived manifold of appearances, though not as an innate
or permanently indwelling structure. As a corollary, this reverses the usual metaphysical
principle that humans, possessing self-awareness and existing as thinking subjects or
Gemüter, have embodied minds or souls; rather, we can now have the transcendental view
that the human body, as matter and appearance, is ensouled, existing along with all other
appearances within the mind.
The argument continues with an analysis of Kant’s attempted synthesis of science and
religion through the positioning of practical reason. This includes the human capacity for
authentic moral decision-making, something only possible for a mind not subject to the
causal constraints of the natural world. As such, I present what I call the ‘view-from’ reading
of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, in which I draw from his writings the implication that the
human mind does not maintain a place in its own representations, and may be considered
within transcendental reflection as a point of view. Because of this, we can think of mind as a
non-corporeal thing in itself of which we can have no predicated cognition, whose attendance
is a possible accompaniment of all experience, and something whose presence as soul we
4may accept for the purposes of moral praxis. I also argue that such an account in no way
commits Kant to any form of spiritualism, since the mind/matter dichotomy dissolves through
the realisation that matter is mere appearance, and therefore mind content only, as is the idea
of soul, which does not posit the existence of any entity and is of regulative use only. On this
reading the mind or soul is an idea whose acceptance is made necessary by normative ethics
and for us remains unknown as it is in itself.
Kant’s practical extension of reason derives from the demands of the moral law, that is, the
categorical imperative in its various formulations, for which the reward for virtue and
submission to duty is uncertain within nature. This creates the moral necessity for the ideas of
continuing personal existence and an ens realissimum in order to ensure the ultimate
possibility of happiness and justice within a community of rational beings. Such ideas are not
made available through the inferences of theoretical speculation, but from the exercise of
practical reasoning. The subjection of theoretical reason to the practical enables these to
speak univocally, in that theoretical reason, while precluded from the conclusions of the
practical, must acquiesce to them and by doing so fulfil the demands of reason for totality and
the possibility of happiness.
The moral law gains equal scientific status to the theoretical content of science through the
realisation that the dynamics of nature, considered transcendentally, result from the influence
of things in themselves, among which we now include free human volition. Consequently, the
inferences drawn from the moral law also take on this scientific standing, resulting in a
minimalist set of justified rational and secular religious beliefs expressed as the Canon of
Pure Reason.
Ultimately, I argue, Kant reduces all forms of human experience to mental content, either as
intuited perceptions, or as concepts and ideas. Beginning with this idealist underpinning, I see
him attempting to provide a more coherent and unified account of the human condition than
is available in other metaphysical or religious systems. Further, I conclude that he was
concerned with a unique metaphysical development, and that as we read him a lucid
theological reform agenda becomes apparent. In this way, I construe Kant’s writings as
offering a new and secular deist outlook that eschews atheism, theism, unwarranted belief
systems, and the demands of those endorsing a continuance of the long-standing schism
between religious thought and the disciplines of science.
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